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Abstract
We use the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) quantile
regression technique to construct and analyse the complete tail risk connected-
ness network of the whole US industry system. We also investigate the
empirical relationship between input–output linkages and the tail risk spill-
overs among US industries. Our findings identify the tail-risk drivers, tail-risk
receivers, and tail-risk distributors among industries and confirm that the
actual trade flow between industries is a major driver of their tail risk
connectedness.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Fat tail has long been a well-recognized feature of asset
returns. Many studies over the last decade have demon-
strated that tail risk is an important price determining
factor (see Bali, Demirtas, & Levy, 2009; Bollerslev &
Todorov, 2011; Chabi-Yo, Ruenzi, & Weigert, 2018; Har-
ris, Nguyen, & Stoja, 2019; Huang, Liu, Rhee, &
Wu, 2012; Kelly & Jiang, 2014; Meine, Supper, &
Weib, 2016; among others). Tail risk significantly affects
returns at both market level and individual security level.
Therefore, monitoring and predicting tail risk play a cen-
tral role in risk management.
Numerous evidences in the literature show strong
connectedness between returns of different assets, espe-
cially during distress time. Ang and Chen (2002) demon-
strate that the comovement of the US stocks and the
aggregate market is greater for downside moves than for
upside moves, and the difference is significantly higher
for extreme movements. Kenourgios, Samitas, and
Paltalidis (2011) document significant contagion effects
between international markets during distress periods, as
shown by the jumps in the correlations of stock markets
in the well-known financial crises over the last few
decades. Madaleno and Pinho (2012) use continuous
wavelet analysis to show the contagion between interna-
tional stock markets during crisis periods. Cappiello,
Gérard, Kadareja, and Manganelli (2014) use quantile
regression to construct the probability of coexceedances
between international equity market returns for different
quantile levels and examine the dynamics of the proba-
bility conditional on economic indicators. Their results
confirm the increase in the comovement of equity mar-
kets in distress periods, and the change is significantly
more pronounced for left-tail comovement than right-tail
comovement.
A number of studies have documented the tail risk
interdependence at different aggregation levels, including
country, industry, and firm levels. The most popular
strand in this literature is, perhaps, the tail risk
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connectedness between countries, for example
Kenourgios et al. (2011) and Cappiello et al. (2014) men-
tioned above. Li and Giles (2015) use a multivariate gen-
eralized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
model to examine both volatility and shock spillovers
between developed and emerging international stock
markets. Other studies at the country level are Bae,
Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), Hartmann, Straetmans, and De
Vries (2004), Hong, Liu, and Wang (2009), Christiansen
and Ranaldo (2009), Beine, Cosma, and
Vermeulen (2010), among others.
At industry level, research on tail risk interrelation-
ship tends to centre around the financial sector. Adams,
Füss, and Gropp (2014) use a system of quantile regres-
sions of Value-at-Risk (hereafter VaR) to investigate the
tail risk interdependence between four types of financial
services, including commercial banks, investment banks,
hedge funds, and insurance companies. They show that
commercial banks and hedge funds play important roles
in the tail risk transmission between financial institu-
tions. Wang, Xie, He, and Stanley (2017) develop mea-
sures of tail risk connectedness for four sectors, namely
banks, diversified financials, insurance, and real estate.
Their measures are based on the tail risk linkages
between institutions across sectors, which are estimated
using the Granger causality test for VaR proposed by
Hong et al. (2009). Chiu, Pena, and Wang (2015) examine
the coexceedances of US real sectors with the financial
sector and report significant tail risk spillover from the
financial sector to many other sectors. The spillover effect
is dependent on industry characteristics such as competi-
tion, debt financing, valuation, and investment level.
Pouliasis, Kyriakou, and Papapostolou (2017) is among a
handful of studies that examine the tail risk linkages
between non-financial industries. Using Hong et al. (2009)
causality test for VaR exceedance, they report the preva-
lent left tail spillovers between consumer service indus-
tries. In similar spirit, Pouliasis, Papapostolou, Kyriakou,
and Visvikis (2018) report strong tail risk spillover
between segments of US shipping sectors.
Reboredo (2015) finds evidence of the tail dependence
between oil and energy sectors.
Studies on tail risk linkages at firm level remarkably
focus on financial firms (Betz, Hautsch, Peltonen, &
Schienle, 2016; Billio, Getmansky, Lo, & Pelizzon, 2012;
Hartmann, Straetmans, & De Vries, 2005; Hautsch,
Schaumburg, & Schienle, 2014; Hautsch, Schaumburg, &
Schienle, 2015; among others). This is not surprising
since firms in financial sector are strongly connected and
the risk of systematic collapse is high. As shown in
Härdle, Wang, and Yu (2016), the term “too connected to
fail” becomes relevant for financial firms. In addition to
the tail risk interdependence among firms, many studies
examine the contribution of the institutions to the tail
risk of the financial system, which is known as the sys-
temic risk. A review on systemic risk literature is avail-
able in Benoit, Colliard, Hurlin, and Pérignon (2017).
The above discussion shows that, apart from the
investigation in the financial sector, the tail risk connect-
edness has received little attention at the industry and
firm level. Thus, our study contributes to this strand of
literature by constructing a complete tail risk connected-
ness network between all industries in the US economy.
We use the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Oper-
ator (LASSO) quantile regression technique in our study.
LASSO quantile regression is developed by Belloni and
Chernozhukov (2011) and applied in the construction of
the financial network tail risk spillover by Hautsch
et al. (2015). The most important feature of this method
is that it filters out non-relevant regressors in a high-
dimensional quantile regression and still consistently
estimates the coefficients of the retained relevant regres-
sors. Thus, it enables the high-dimensional investigation
of the whole US industry system in our study where we
simultaneously model the impact of every industry's tail
risk on the tail risk of other industries, controlling for
both macroeconomic variables and industry specific char-
acteristics. To our knowledge, this study is the first one to
construct and analyse the empirical tail risk connected-
ness network of the whole US industry system.
Understanding the tail risk interdependence
between all industries in the economy is essential for
policy makers, business managers, and investors. Sev-
eral studies show that the shock spillovers between
industries can lead to the aggregate fluctuation of the
entire economy (see Gabaix, 2011; Long &
Plosser, 1983; Shea, 2002; among others). Thus, by
identifying the most important shock-driving indus-
tries, the most shock-sensitive industries, as well as
possible channels of shock transmissions in the econ-
omy, policy makers can properly regulate relevant
industries and have prompt actions to prevent the
snowball effect of industries' shocks which can poten-
tially destabilize the whole system. Firms can make
better decisions when trading with their partners in
different industries, by observing and predicting shocks
transmitted to and from their partners. For investors,
especially fund managers, knowledge about the tail
risk interdependence network of the whole economic
system is essential not only for predicting the tail risk
of individual securities, but also for managing the risk
of their portfolio. For example, if their portfolio mainly
consists of stocks in highly tail risk connected indus-
tries, their tail risk is undiversifiable. If investors
ignore this linkage, they are likely to underestimate
the total risk of the portfolio and cannot deliver the
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desired risk target. Thus, understanding the tail risk
connectedness network would benefit various stake-
holders in the economy.
In addition to constructing the tail risk connectedness
network, we move one step further to demonstrate how
this network is influenced by the actual business linkages
between industries. We hypothesize that the actual trade
flow between industries is a major driver of their tail risk
connectedness. We utilize the Input–Output Accounts
provided by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
to quantify the strength of the supplier-customer link-
ages, following the method of Becker and Thomas (2011)
and Ahern and Harford (2014). Specifically, we measure
the role of an industry in the supplier and customer pro-
files of its trading partners. We then carry out a cross-sec-
tional regression to examine the extent to which these
business linkage variables explain the tail risk spillover
coefficients obtained from the tail risk connectedness net-
work. This investigation reveals the economic rationale
underlying the structure of the tail risk connectedness
network.
This investigation of our paper contributes to a strand
in the literature regarding the impact of actual business
linkages on various aspects of the stock market perfor-
mance. For example, at international level, Forbes and
Chinn (2004) show return spillovers in stock and bond
markets across countries are significantly influenced by
bilateral trade flows. At industry level, Ahern (2013) finds
evidence that industry linkages affect stock returns.
Industries which are more central in the network have
higher risk due to higher exposure to sectoral shocks and,
therefore, require a positive risk premium. Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2017) develop a theoretical
model for an economy with sectoral input–output link-
ages and show that the level of the interconnection
between industries plays a key role in economic shock
spillovers among industries. At firm level, Cohen and
Frazzini (2008) show that customers' returns can forecast
subsequent stock returns and operating incomes of their
suppliers. Although some papers examine the impact of
supplier-customer relationship on the interdependence of
stock returns and volatility at different levels, the impact
of business linkages on tail risk spillovers has gained far
less attention. This paper, to our knowledge, is the first
one to examine the empirical relationship between
input–output linkages and the tail risk spillovers.
Our empirical results reveal a complicated tail risk
connectedness network between industries. Furthermore,
we find significant impact of the actual business linkages
on the tail risk spillovers among industries. Specifically,
the customer roles of industries significantly influence
the spillover coefficients between industries. When an
industry is a larger customer to the other industry, they
tend to have stronger tail risk connections. We also
observe that business linkages account for the majority of
the explanatory power of the cross-sectional regression,
suggesting that business linkage is the main driver of the
tail risk connectedness network. Our results are robust to
both normal and distress periods, different extreme levels
of tail risk, and restricted samples of nonfinancial indus-
tries and closely linked industries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses the tail risk connectedness between
US industries using the LASSO quantile regression. Sec-
tion 3 describes the construction of business linkage vari-
ables from the Input–Output Accounts, and the impact of
business linkages on tail risk spillovers. Section 4 reports
robustness checks and Section 5 concludes.
2 | TAIL RISK CONNECTEDNESS
2.1 | LASSO quantile regression
The use of quantile regression to capture tail risk is well-
established in the literature (see, e.g., Adrian & Bru-
nnermeier, 2016; Giglio, Kelly, & Pruitt, 2016; among
others). To model the tail risk connectedness of the
whole US industry system, we follow Hautsch et al. (2015)
to use the LASSO quantile regression developed by Bel-
loni and Chernozhukov (2011). Specifically, we estimate
a quantile regression equation showing how the tail risk
of an industry i returns is explained by the loss exceed-
ance (i.e., returns lower than a pre-determined tail
threshold) of each of the other industries, the lagged
returns of industry i, industry i's specific characteristics,
and macroeconomic variables. As argued by Hautsch
et al. (2015), the advantage of this approach is that it
allows us to investigate the tail risk connectedness
between all industries in the economy.
The tail risk of an industry at time t is measured by
the VaR of its returns at that time, which is the quantile
corresponding to the VaR significance level of the condi-
tional distribution of the industry returns at time t:
VaRiq,t =Q
i
q,t ð1Þ
and Qiq,t satisfies
P Xit ≤Q
i
q,t
 
= q ð2Þ
where VaRiq,t is the Value-at-Risk of industry i at q signifi-
cance level; Qiq,t is the q-quantile of the conditional distri-
bution of Xit - the returns of industry i at time t. Similar
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to Hautsch et al. (2015), we use q= 5% quantile in our
main investigation. Other significance levels of tail risk (1
and 10% quantile) are examined in our robustness check
discussed in Section 4. It should be noted that, for the
convenience of the interpretation of the tail risk spillover
coefficients in our paper, we define VaR in terms of
industry returns rather than industry loss. Thus, a more
negative VaR implies higher tail risk.
The quantile regression equation of industry i is
given as:
VaRiq,t = α
i + βiCit−1 + γ
iM t−1 + θ
iE− it +ω
iXit−1 ð3Þ
where Cit−1 is the lagged specific factors of industry i, Mt
− 1 is the lagged macroeconomic variables, Xit−1 is the
lagged return of industry i, and E− it is the loss exceedance
of all other industries in the economy except industry i.
The loss exceedance of an industry j is defined as:
E jt =
0,X jt≥unconditional 10%sample quantile of X j
X jt ,otherwise
 !
ð4Þ
In Equation (4), we follow Hautsch et al. (2015) to use
the 10% sample quantile for loss exceedance in all investiga-
tions.1 The coefficient θij in Equation (3) shows the level
of the tail risk spillover from industry j to industry i.
Higher θij indicates that when industry j is in a more dis-
tress situation (i.e., its return gets more negative), the
VaR of industry i reduces by a larger amount, implying
higher industry i's tail risk. In short, higher coefficient θij
means stronger tail risk spillover from industry j to indus-
try i.
Equation (3) is estimated using Belloni and Cher-
nozhukov (2011) LASSO quantile regression method. First,
the irrelevant regressors of the equation are determined as
any regressor whose estimated coefficient from the l1-penal-
ized quantile regression has the absolute value smaller than
a predetermined threshold. We follow Hautsch et al. (2015)
to choose the cut-off threshold of 0.0001. Given a quantile
regression of variable Xi on the set of demeaned regressor
Wi, the estimated parameters ~ξ
i
of the corresponding l1-
penalized quantile regression are the ones that minimize:
1
T
XT
t=1
q−I Xit ≤W
i
tξ
i   Xit−W itξi + λ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 1−qð Þp
T
XK
k=1
σ^k ξ
i
k
 
ð5Þ
where I() is the indicator function that equals 1 when
the statement inside the bracket is true and 0 otherwise,
T is the number of observations in the estimation sample,
K is the number of regressors in Wi, ξik is the k
th element
of the coefficient set ξi, and σ^k is the standard deviation
of the kth regressor, which could be estimated as
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
T
XT
t=1
Wit,k
 2
vuut ð6Þ
In Equation (5), λ is the penalty parameter and a
higher level of λ means more variables would be elimi-
nated. λ is determined specific to each industry in a data
driven way that maximiszes the backtesting performance
of the estimated VaR of the industry. Details about this
procedure are provided in Appendix A. The coefficients
of the retained relevant regressors will be then estimated
consistently using a normal quantile regression of the
dependent variable on the relevant regressors, which is
referred to as the post-LASSO regression. The value of
the component θij in the coefficient vector θ
i in Equa-
tion (3) equals the value of the coefficient associated with
industry j in the post-LASSO regression if industry j is
retained as a relevant regressor, and 0 otherwise.
After estimating Equation (3) for every industry in
the system, we construct the tail risk connectedness
matrix A = {Aij} where the entry of row i and column j,
Aij, equals θ
i
j . For every pair of industries, there are two
tail risk connectedness coefficients: θij showing the spill-
over from j to i, and θ ji showing the spillover from i to j.
From the connectedness matrix, we obtain the tail risk
in-degree of an industry i as the number of industries
which transmit tail risk to industry i, and the tail risk
out-degree of industry i as the number of industries
which receive tail risk from industry i. The tail risk net-
degree of industry i is the difference between its out-
degree and in-degree, showing whether the industry i is a
tail-risk driver or a tail-risk receiver in the system. We
calculate the total number of connections in matrix A to
capture the total level of connectedness of the whole
system.
2.2 | Data
We construct the industry returns as the market capital
weighted average returns of all stocks traded in NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ with share codes 10 and 11 from
the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data-
base. We classify stocks into industries based on the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
codes, which are also used in the Input–Output database
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
This facilitates our analysis on the relationship between
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tail risk connectedness and business linkages among
industries which we discuss in Section 3. We use the
Input–Output Accounts at the summary level which con-
sists of 71 industries in the US economy. After eliminat-
ing industries in the government sector and industries
without observations from CRSP database, we are left
with 59 industries for our investigation. The list of indus-
tries and their corresponding abbreviations are provided
in Appendix B. We use weekly returns during a 12-year
period from January 2005 to December 2016.
Regarding macroeconomic variables, similar to
Hautsch et al. (2015) and Adrian and Bru-
nnermeier (2016), we use the implied volatility index, the
short-term liquidity spread (measured as the spread
between the 3-month collateral repo rate and the 3-
month Treasury Bill rate), the change in 3-month Trea-
sury Bill rate, the change in the slope of the yield curve
(measured as the spread between the 10-year Treasury
Note and the 3-month Treasury Bill), the change in credit
spread between BAA rated bonds and the 10-year Trea-
sury Note, and the CRSP index returns. We obtain the
implied volatility index VIX from the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, the 3-month collateral repo rate from
Bloomberg, and the BAA bond rate, the 10-year Treasury
Note rate, and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Given the limited availability of accounting ratios for
the whole US industry system, we construct a database
for industry characteristics based on the accounting data
of all companies in Compustat database. Specifically, we
sort the companies in Compustat by their NAICS codes,
then aggregate the accounting data of all firms in an
industry to represent the characteristics of the whole
industry.2 In line with Hautsch et al. (2015), we control
for leverage (total asset over total book value of equity),
maturity mismatch (short term debt net of cash, divided
by total liabilities), size (natural logarithm of total asset),
and daily volatility over a week in the quantile regres-
sion. In order to obtain weekly observations of quarterly
accounting ratios, similar to Hautsch et al. (2015), we use
interpolation with cubic splines. Appendix C provides the
summary statistics of all industry data in our research.
2.3 | Tail risk connectedness network
between US industries
We estimate the LASSO quantile regression for every
industry to obtain the tail risk spillover coefficients. We
then construct the connectedness matrix A between all
industries in the US economy from the estimated coeffi-
cients. For a network of 59 industries, there are 3,422
possible pairwise directional spillovers. We observe 694
significant tail risk spillovers, which is about 20% of the
total possible directional connections, chosen as relevant
regressors by the LASSO procedure. This is consistent
with the structure of the US economy in which each
industry, by its nature, is only closely linked to a few
related partner industries. Further evidence for this will
be provided in the degree analysis and the business link-
age investigation.
Figure 1 presents a graph which illustrates the tail
risk connectedness network between US industries. An
arrow with the direction from industry i to industry j
implies that industry i is selected by the LASSO quantile
regression as a relevant driver of the VaR of industry j. If
i is eliminated by the LASSO quantile regression in
explaining the VaR of j, there is no arrow from i to j. The
thickness of the arrows illustrates the level of tail risk
spillovers. A thin (light grey) arrow represents the tail
risk spillover coefficient with absolute value smaller than
0.4, a medium-size (dark grey) arrow represents the coef-
ficient with absolute value from 0.4 to 0.8, and a thick
(black) arrow displays the coefficient with absolute value
larger than 0.8.3 The majority (93.3%) of the tail risk con-
nectedness is weak, as shown by a large number of thin
arrows in the graph. Some of the strongest tail risk spill-
overs identified in the network are those from Adminis-
trative and support service (ADM) to Social Assistance
(SA) with the spillover coefficient of 1.2, from Insurance
carriers and related activities (INS) to Legal services
(LGL) with the spillover coefficient of 1.19, and from
Other transportation and support activities (OTP) to Air
transportation (ARTP) with the spillover coefficient
of 1.04.
In addition to pairwise spillovers, we also observe the
distributions of the connectedness degree measures of US
industries. Figure 2 plots the histograms of the out-
degree, in-degree and net-degree measures. The average
out-degree is about 12, implying that shock to an industry
can transmit to 12 other industries on average. This num-
ber is reasonable since each industry, due to its business
nature, only have direct influence on some closely related
partners in the economy. A few industries have the out-
degree levels of around 30, suggesting that they have con-
siderably high systemic contribution to the economy.
Meanwhile, the in-degree distribution spreads out quite
evenly between 0 and 23, implying the sensitivity to tail
risk transmission varies significantly across US indus-
tries. While some industries are quite vulnerable, receiv-
ing shocks from more than 20 other industries in the
network, some industries tend not to be affected by tail
risk spillovers from others.
Finally, based on the net-degree measure, an industry
can be considered as a risk driver, risk receiver, or risk
distributor. Risk drivers are industries with highly
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positive net-degree, whose risk can significantly affect a
large number of other industries while they are relatively
unaffected by the others' shocks. Risk receivers are indus-
tries with highly negative net-degree. These industries are
sensitive to shocks transmitted from other industry part-
ners. Industries with net-degree around 0 are considered as
risk distributors. They receive tail risk from other industries
and amplify the risk in the system by transmitting it to
others. As can be seen in the third chart of Figure 2, most
industries act as risk distributors in the network.
Table 1 reports top five and bottom five industries for
each tail risk connectedness degree measure. Firstly, in
term of the out-degree measure, Construction (CTN),
Other retail (OR), and Electrical equipment, appliances,
and components (ELT) are the top industries whose tail
risk spills over to about half of the number of industries
in the economy. In contrast, Motion picture and sound
recording industries (MP) and Food services and drinking
places (FDP) affect only one or two other industries. This
is justifiable since these industries mainly interact with
final users, rather than contributing to the production of
other industries in the economy.
Secondly, regarding the in-degree measure, Computer
system design and related services (CPTS), Printing and
FIGURE 1 Tail risk connectedness
network between US industries. This
graph shows the tail risk connectedness
between 59 US industries estimated
from the LASSO quantile regression.
Thick black arrows show the spillovers
with the absolute values of the estimated
coefficient greater than 0.8. Medium
dark grey arrows show the spillovers
with the absolute values of the estimated
coefficient from 0.4 to 0.8. Thin light
grey arrows show the spillovers with the
absolute values of the estimated
coefficient less than 0.4. The direction of
an arrow shows the direction of the
spillover
FIGURE 2 Distributions of the degree measures of 59 US industries. This figure shows the histograms of the tail risk connectedness
degree measures of 59 US industries, calculated from the tail risk spillovers estimated from the LASSO quantile regression. Panel 1, 2 and 3
plots the out-degree, in-degree, and net-degree, respectively
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related support activities (PRT) and Waste management
and remediation services (WAST) are the top industries
which receive risk spillovers from 23 other industries,
while Social assistance (SA), Chemical products (CMC),
and General merchandize stores (GMST) are industries
that are affected by only one industry. Oil and gas extrac-
tion (OG) is the most tail-risk resistant industry in the
economy with a zero in-degree level. In other words, the
tail risk of Oil and gas extraction (OG) is not significantly
affected by any other industry in the economy. This is
not surprising since the risk of this industry tends to be
driven by the supply shocks in major oil and gas
supplying countries, or the aggregate demand shocks
from the economy rather than by shocks from any partic-
ular industry. This is consistent with Baumeister and
Kilian (2016) who show a number of supply shocks that
drive the oil market in the history. Kilian (2009) shows
that the main drivers of the oil market are global aggre-
gate demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks.
Thirdly, we observe that the main risk drivers (i.e.,
industries with the highest net-degree level) are usually
the top out-degree industries (e.g., Electrical equipment,
appliances, and components (ELT), Other retails (OR),
and Construction (CTN)) while the main risk receivers (i.
TABLE 1 Tail risk connectedness degree measures - Top and bottom industries
Industry name Abbreviation Value of degree measure
Out-degree Highest Construction CTN 31
Other retail OR 28
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components ELT 25
Computer systems design and related services CPTS 23
Furniture and related products FURN 20
Lowest Amusements, gambling, and recreation industries RCT 3
Support activities for mining MNGS 2
Wholesale trade WST 2
Food services and drinking places FDP 2
Motion picture and sound recording industries MP 1
In-degree Highest Computer systems design and related services CPTS 23
Printing and related support activities PRT 23
Waste management and remediation services WAST 23
Other transportation equipment OTPE 23
Other services, except government OS 21
Lowest Hospitals HOSP 2
General merchandize stores GMST 1
Chemical products CMC 1
Social assistance SA 1
Oil and gas extraction OG 0
Net-degree Highest Electrical equipment, appliances, and components ELT 22
Other retail OR 20
General merchandize stores GMST 18
Construction CTN 16
Other transportation and support activities OTP 13
Lowest Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation, and
related activities
FED −14
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles FUND −14
Other transportation equipment OTPE −16
Food services and drinking places FDP −16
Wholesale trade WST −18
Note: This table shows the top and bottom industries for the tail risk degree measures, including the out-degree, in-degree and net-degree.
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e., industries with the lowest net-degree level) are the
bottom out-degree industries (e.g., Wholesale trade
(WST) and Food services and drinking places (FDP)).
Due to the nature of businesses, shocks to some indus-
tries can affect a large number of other industries (high
out-degree) while these industries may not be signifi-
cantly influenced by shock transmission from their part-
ners (low in-degree). Thus, they are the main risk drivers.
To demonstrate, the production of Electrical equipment,
appliances, and components (ELT) relates to many trad-
ing partners, both by using the inputs and producing
goods which are essential for other industries. Although
it can also receive shocks from others, its shocks are more
relevant to other trading partners. On the other hand,
some industries tend to receive risks from others. They
are quite vulnerable to external shocks (high in-degree);
however, their shocks appear to be insignificant to their
partners (low out-degree). An example is Wholesale trade
(WST) which distributes goods across the economy. It is
understandable why its business is significantly driven by
the state of the whole economy and this industry tends to
be a shock receiver in the network.
The tail risk connectedness matrix is useful for moni-
toring the tail risk structure of the whole economy, and
also the risk of any particular industry. This is especially
important for business managers and investors who
invest in a specific industry or some related industries. To
demonstrate, Figure 3 shows the tail risk connectedness
between the Electrical equipment, appliances, and
components industry (ELT) and its related industries,
where ELT takes the role of risk driver (Panel A) and risk
receiver (Panel B). If there is a shock to ELT, investors
and managers can quickly identify industries that will be
directly affected. In addition, to predict the tail risk of
ELT, managers and investors can observe shocks to its
main risk drivers (e.g., Fabricated metal products
(FMTL), Computer and electronic products (CPT), and
Computer systems design and related services (CPTS)).
3 | THE INFLUENCE OF
INDUSTRY BUSINESS LINKAGES
3.1 | Input–Output accounts and
business linkage variables
We measure the strength of the business linkages
between industries using the data from the Input–Output
(IO) Accounts provided by the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis. The value of commodity inputs and outputs of every
industry in the US economy are reported in two main
tables: the Make and the Use tables (for snapshots of
these tables see Appendix D). The Make table reports the
value of the commodities (in columns) produced by the
industries (in rows). The total output of industry i, den-
oted by OUTPUTi, is obtained as the sum of all entries in
row i. The total output of a commodity produced by all
industries is the sum of all entries in a column. The Use
FIGURE 3 Tail risk spillover network of ELT industry. This graph shows the tail risk spillover network of the Electrical equipment,
appliances, and components (ELT) industry. ELT takes the role of tail risk transmitter in Panel A and tail risk receiver in Panel B. Dark grey
arrows show the spillovers with the absolute values of the estimated coefficient from 0.4 to 0.8. Light grey arrows show the spillovers with
the absolute values of the estimated coefficient smaller than 0.4. The direction of an arrow shows the direction of the spillover
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table presents the value of commodities purchased as
inputs by industries (or consumed by final users). Com-
modities are reported in rows while industries are listed
in columns. The sum of all entries in a row is the total
commodity output while the sum of all entries in a col-
umn is the total industry input, denoted by INPUTj for
industry j. Total industry input plus the total value added
gives the total industry output, presented in the last row
of the Use table.
To measure the strength of the supplier-customer
relationship between industries, we follow Ahern and
Harford (2014) and Becker and Thomas (2011) to con-
struct the CUST and SUPP matrices. First, using informa-
tion from the Make table, we calculate the subordinate
SHARE matrix. Specifically, the element in row i, column
c, denoted SHAREic, is calculated as:
SHAREic =
Makeic
Total Supplyc
ð7Þ
where i and c index industry and commodity, respec-
tively. Makeic is the element in row i, column c of the
Make table, showing the value of commodity c produced
by industry i. Total Supplyc is the total supply of com-
modity c, which includes the total output of commodity c
produced by all the industries plus other components
such as imports or changes in inventories. Thus, the
SHARE matrix presents the contribution of an industry
in the total supply of each commodity in the economy.
Next, we construct the REVSHARE matrix, of which
the element in row i, column j, REVSHAREij, is
obtained as:
REVSHAREij =
XC
c=1
SHAREic ×Usecj
  ð8Þ
where SHAREic (row i, column c element of the SHARE
matrix) presents the proportion of commodity c produced
by industry i, and Usecj (row c, column j element in the
Use table) shows the value of commodity c used as inputs
in the production of industry j.4 Therefore, REVSHARE
matrix shows the value of all commodities traded
between every pair of industries.
Finally, we construct the CUST and SUPP matrices,
showing the customer and supplier roles of an industry to
another industry, respectively. Specifically, the elements in
row i, column j in the CUST matrix, denoted by CUSTij, and
in the SUPPmatrix, denoted by SUPPij,are calculated as:
CUSTij =
REVSHAREij
OUTPUTi
ð9Þ
SUPPij =
REVSHAREij
INPUT j
ð10Þ
where REVSHAREij is the total value of all commodities
which industry j purchases from industry i, OUTPUTi is
the total output value of industry i in the Make table and
INPUTj is the total input value of industry j.
5 Thus, CUS-
Tij shows the proportion of industry i's revenue generated
by industry j and SUPPij shows the proportion of industry
j's total input purchased from industry i.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of business linkages
between industries based on the relationship variables (CUST,
SUPP) constructed from the IO tables of 71 industries. We
only report the results for 59 industries in our sample. We use
the average relationship variables during the 12-year sample
period from 2005 to 2016.6 For a pair of industries, we obtain
four relationship variables (CUSTji, SUPPij, CUSTij, and SUP-
Pji). Based on the value of the relationship variables, we clas-
sify industry pairs as having weak or close business linkages
at different threshold ranging from 1 to 10%. The first row of
Table 2 shows that at 1 threshold, 1,106 among 1,711 industry
pairs, or 64.6% of the pairs, have weak linkages, with all rela-
tionship variables smaller than 1%. This is justifiable in a
developed economy like the US, where industries are well
classified, and each industry tends to largely trade with only a
few main suppliers and customers. While 359 pairs have at
least one main customer (i.e., at least one CUST variable is
larger than 1%), 506 pairs have at least one main supplier (i.
e., at least one SUPP variable is larger than 1%). In general,
605 pairs have strong linkages, with at least one of the four
relationship variables larger than 1%. Obviously, the number
of closely linked industry pairs decreases as the threshold
increases. At 10% level, only 41 pairs, or about 2.4% of the
pairs, have strong business relationship. This is consistent
with the structure of the tail risk connectedness network. This
evidence offers the first clue for the influence of business link-
ages on tail risk spillovers between industries, which will be
examined in the next section.
3.2 | The influence of business linkages
on tail risk spillovers
We now examine the extent to which the tail risk spill-
overs are affected by the business linkages between
industry i and industry j. Specifically, we estimate a
cross-sectional regression as follows:
Aji =φ0 +φ1CUSTji +φ2SUPPij +φ3CUSTij +φ4SUPPji
+ vijδ+ ϵij
ð11Þ
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where Aji is the element of the connectedness matrix A,
showing the tail risk spillover from industry i to industry
j. CUSTji, SUPPij, CUSTij, and SUPPji represent the cus-
tomer role of i to j, the supplier role of i to j, the customer
role of j to i, and the supplier role of j to i, respectively. vij
is a row vector of industry characteristics of industry i
and industry j; φ0, φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4 are estimated coeffi-
cients, δ includes all estimated coefficients of the industry
specific characteristics; and ϵij is the residual term. We
include in vij the industry characteristics used in the qua-
ntile regression of industries. The explanatory variables
in the cross-sectional regression in Equation (11) are the
average of the characteristic and linkage variables of an
industry over the whole sample period. For each pair of
industry i and industry j, we obtain two spillover coeffi-
cients - Aij and Aji. Consequently, from the 1,711 industry
pairs, we obtain 3,422 cross-section observations. We
bootstrap the standard errors of the estimated coefficients
with 1,000 resampling to account for the fact that the
dependent variables are estimated from the first stage
quantile regression. The sign and the significance of the
coefficients φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4 reveal the influence of the
actual business linkages between industries on the tail
risk spillovers between them.
Table 3 reports the results of the cross-sectional
regression. We observe significant impact of business
linkages on the tail risk spillovers between industries. We
find the tail risk spillover from industry i to industry j is
significantly and positively related to the customer roles
of the two industries. This means when an industry
becomes a larger customer of the other industry, its tail
risk tends to spill more strongly to its partner and is also
more affected by its partner. The fact that the customer
relationship significantly influences the tail risk connect-
edness between industries reflects the customer-oriented
culture of the US business. Moreover, we observe that the
business linkage variables account for the majority of the
explanatory power of the regression. The inclusion of
industry characteristic variables only marginally
increases the R-squared of the regression and most of the
coefficients are insignificant. This result strongly con-
firms our hypothesis that the main underlying rationale
of the spillover dynamics between industries in the US
economy is the actual business linkages between them.
4 | ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
4.1 | Tail risk connectedness in different
market conditions
In this section, we examine the tail risk connectedness
network between US industries, and how the spillovers
are affected by their business linkages in different market
conditions. We include a crisis dummy variable as well as
its interaction terms with all explanatory variables in the
first stage LASSO quantile regression. The crisis
dummy (D) takes the value of 1 for weeks starting from
January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2009, and 0 otherwise.
The coefficients corresponding to the loss exceedance
terms capture the tail risk spillover between industries in
normal period. The coefficients of the interaction terms
between the crisis dummy and loss exceedance show the
change in tail risk spillovers between industries in crisis
period.
We obtain two tail risk connectedness matrices from
the LASSO quantile regression: A is the tail risk connect-
edness matrix in normal period constructed from the
coefficients of the loss exceedance terms, and DA pre-
sents the change in A due to crisis. The elements in DA
are the coefficients of the interaction terms between the
dummy crisis and loss exceedances. We also construct
matrix ADA as the sum of A and DA matrices, which
shows the value of the spillover coefficients in the crisis
TABLE 2 Summary statistics of the business linkages between US industries
Business linkage threshold (percent)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Pairs with weak linkage 1,106 1,361 1,489 1,549 1,588 1,622 1,640 1,654 1,663 1,670
Pairs with at least one main customer 359 178 101 72 56 46 39 30 25 22
Pairs with at least one main supplier 506 283 179 124 93 64 50 39 31 24
Pairs with at least one main customer or main supplier 605 350 222 162 123 89 71 57 48 41
Note: This table shows the summary statistics of the business linkages of 1,711 industry pairs based on the relationship variables (CUSTji,
SUPPij, CUSTij, and SUPPji) at different thresholds ranging from 1 to 10% (in columns). Pairs with weak linkage are pairs with all four rela-
tionship variables smaller than the threshold. Pairs with at least one main customer (supplier) are pairs with at least one CUST (SUPP) vari-
able larger than the threshold. Pairs with at least one main customer or supplier are pairs with at least one of the four relationship variables
larger than the threshold.
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period. This framework can generate several scenarios of
the difference of tail risk spillovers between normal time
and distress time. First, for a non-zero entry in A, we say
that the tail risk connectedness changes in crisis time if
its corresponding entry in DA is different from zero, and
there is no change in the crisis period if its corresponding
entry in DA is zero. If the corresponding non-zero entry
in DA has the opposite sign and almost similar magni-
tude with the entry in A, the tail risk spillover between
the two industries almost disappears in crisis period. Sec-
ond, for a zero entry in A, a corresponding non-zero
entry in DA implies that an industry starts to affect its
partner in crisis time. Due to the large scale of the A, DA,
and ADA matrices, we do not report these tables in our
paper. The tables are available from the authors upon
request.
The results of this investigation show that there are
changes in the tail risk transmissions between indus-
tries in crisis period. We observe a 5.4% increase in the
number of relevant spillovers, from 608 spillovers in
normal time to 641 spillovers in crisis time. No tail risk
connectedness disappears in crisis period. In contrast,
57 spillover coefficients change values due to crisis.
Taking a closer look at the financial industries (NAICS
codes from 52X to 53X) in the crisis period, we observe
an average increase of 0.05 in the values of their spill-
over coefficients. There are only three new spillovers
from financial industries to the other industries. Thus,
although the tail risk spillovers between the financial
industries and other industries increase during crisis,
they tend to retain within the established spillover
channels rather than spreading out to more industries
in the system.
We also examine the influence of business linkages
on tail risk spillovers in different market conditions using
the cross-sectional regression. Table 4 shows the results
of this investigation for normal period (Panel A) and dis-
tress period (Panel B). The dependent variables in normal
and distress periods are obtained from the matrix A and
ADA, respectively. The results in Panel A is similar to the
standard framework results in Table 3. Specifically, the
customer roles of both industries significantly and posi-
tively affect the magnitude of tail risk spillovers between
them. Panel B confirms the robustness of our results in
the distress period, where the customer roles are positive
and highly significant. Moreover, in the distress period,
the supplier role of an industry to its partner also has a
significant and positive impact on the industry's tail risk
spillover to its partner. The R-squared is also slightly
higher in the distress period regression compared to that
of the normal period. This implies that, business linkages
can explain the tail risk spillovers among industries more
in distress time.
4.2 | The connectedness at different tail
risk levels
Our standard framework investigates the tail risk con-
nectedness and business linkages between US industries
at 5% VaR level. In this section, we check the sensitivity
of our results to different tail risk levels, by using 1 and
10% VaR level. The results of LASSO quantile regressions
show stronger risk connectedness between industries at a
less extreme level of the tail. The number of relevant tail
risk spillover coefficients increases from 574 at 1% VaR,
to 694 at 5% VaR, and 745 at 10% VaR. The average out-
degree and in-degree of an industry also increase from
9.73 at 1% VaR to 11.76 and 12.63 at 5 and 10% VaR,
respectively. When the very extreme shock of an industry
tends to be generated from its own problem, the tail risk
at a higher significance level (i.e., less extreme tail) can
be accounted for by other factors, such as spillovers from
other industries in the network.
Table 5 reports the results of the cross-sectional
regression showing the influence of business linkages on
tail risk spillover corresponding to different VaR signifi-
cant levels. Comparing the results in this table and in
Table 3, the R-squared coefficients increase as tail risk
significance level increases. Thus, for a less extreme defi-
nition of tail risk, not only industries are getting more
connected, but their connectedness is also more related
to their actual business linkages. We still find the signifi-
cant impacts of the customer roles of both industries i
and j on the tail risk spillover from i to j, which is qualita-
tively similar to our main results.
4.3 | Business linkages and tail risk
spillovers between closely linked
industries
The data we obtain from the SUPP and CUST tables
reveal that, while some industry pairs have strong link-
ages (i.e., at least one industry is the main supplier and/
or main customer of the other industry), many pairs
show weak relationship with very small SUPP and CUST
variables. Therefore, in this robustness check, we exam-
ine the impact of business linkages on tail risk spillovers
between closely related industries. We create sub-samples
of only pairs of industries in which the value of at least
one of the four relationship variables (CUSTji, SUPPij,
CUSTij, and SUPPji) is larger than or equal to a certain
threshold. Our restricted samples consist of 605, 350, and
222 industry pairs at 1, 2, and 3% threshold, respectively.
The results shown in Table 6 are similar to our main
results and confirm the relevance of business linkages in
explaining the tail risk connectedness. More importantly,
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the R-squared coefficients in the regressions of restricted
samples of closely linked pairs are significantly higher
than that of the full sample. This is consistent with our
hypothesis that business linkage is the main driver of tail
risk spillover.
4.4 | Business linkages and tail risk
spillovers between nonfinancial industries
Financial industries are commonly known as influential
industries, since their risk is expected to easily and
strongly propagate to other industries in the economy.
Thus, to examine the impact of business linkages on tail
risk transmission without the possible influence of the
financial sector, we eliminate from our sample five indus-
tries in the financial services, including Federal Reserve
Bank, credit intermediation and related activities (FED);
Securities, commodity contracts and investments (INV);
Insurance carriers and related activities (INS); Funds,
trusts, and other financial vehicles (FUND); Real estate
(RE); and Rental and leasing services and lessors of
intangible assets (RL). The results of the cross-sectional
regression reported in Table 7 are similar to our main
findings, showing significant impacts of economic rela-
tionships on the tail risk transmission between industries.
In addition, the tail risk spillover from an industry to its
partner is significantly affected by the supplier role of the
industry. We also observe a slight increase in the R-
squared coefficient as compared to the standard frame-
work. Thus, this is a solid evidence that tail risk spillover
stems from the actual trade flows rather than from the
comovement with the financial sector.
5 | CONCLUSION
Tail risk connectedness has recently gained attention due
to their important implication in risk management prac-
tise. In this paper, we construct the complete tail risk
connectedness network among all industries in the US
economy using the LASSO quantile regression technique
developed by Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) and
Hautsch et al. (2015). Our results suggest a sophisticated
tail risk connectedness network between US industries.
We reveal important tail risk drivers whose shocks can
influence many other industries, as well as tail risk
receivers which are sensitive to shock spillovers from
their partners. Since shocks from risk driver industries
are likely to be the source of the instability of the whole
economic system, our findings are useful for policy
makers to properly regulate relevant industries. It is pre-
requisite that when considering a certain policy change
in a specific sector or industry, policy makers are aware
of possible impact on other related industries and the
whole economy. Furthermore, understanding channels
that tail events propagate through the system is essential
for regulators to have prompt actions to prevent the
snowball effects. Business managers can benefit from our
findings of tail risk connectedness network by observing
and predicting shocks transmitted to and from their trad-
ing partners to make informed decisions and alter their
trade strategies. Investors and portfolio managers can
incorporate the tail dependence between industries into
their portfolio risk models and, as a result, achieve better
tail risk prediction and more efficient asset allocation.
More importantly, we reveal the underlying economic
rationale of the tail risk interdependence network. Using
the Input–Output Accounts provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis to measure the strength of business
relationships between US industries, we show that busi-
ness linkage is the main driver of the tail risk spillover
network. Our findings are in line with the theoretical
framework proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2017). This adds
another layer of information available to practitioners in
tail risk management. By better understanding the deter-
minants of the tail risk network, investors, managers,
and policy makers can make ex-ante prediction about the
sensitivity of a particular business to external shocks
given its trade practise with other industries.
Our findings are relevant for future research in two
directions. The first direction is to examine the impacts
of business linkages on tail risk spillovers between
firms. Since US public companies are required to iden-
tify their main customers, we can obtain the informa-
tion of firms in the supplier-customer relationship.
This investigation will reveal if business linkages also
influence the tail risk spillovers at firm level. Another
direction is to examine the impact of business linkages
on international tail risk transmission. This may shed
the light on the important question regarding the true
mechanism of tail risk spillovers between markets,
whether it is trade flow or capital flow. This provides
essential understanding for regulators in protecting
and nurturing their home market.
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ENDNOTES
1 We obtain qualitatively similar results if we use 1 and 5% quantile
for loss exceedance. Summary results are available upon request.
2 The accounting data are available quarterly. In a quarter, each
firm in an industry may have different report date. When aggre-
gating their data to create the representative firm of the industry,
we assume that the accounting data of the representative firm is
obtained at the end date of a quarter. The underlying assumption
is that the values of the accounting variables of the constituent
firms do not change much during a quarter. This is a justifiable
assumption given that we only use balance sheet data to construct
industry characteristics.
3 Although most of the coefficients are positive, there are cases
when the spillover coefficients are negative, implying a hedging
relationship between the two industries. In other words, some
industries may benefit from the distress of the other industries.
The hedging relationship in industry pairs is justifiable by looking
at the nature of their businesses. For example, shocks to many
industries have negative influence on the tail risk of legal service
industry, which is reasonable since legal service should have more
business opportunities when other industries are in distress.
4 In this calculation, we apply the assumption in Ahern and Har-
ford (2014) and Becker and Thomas (2011) that market shares are
constant for every use of commodity. To demonstrate, if 60% of
the total supply of commodity c is produced by industry i (i.e.,
SHAREic = 0.6), then industry j purchases 60% of its commodity c
input from industry i.
5 While labour (referred to as employee compensation in the Use
table) is an important input, there is no Labour industry in the
Make table. Thus, we follow Ahern and Harford (2014) to create
an artificial Labour industry in the Use table. This step is only to
ensure that the input values are accurately calculated. The indus-
try will not be included in the final sample for investigation.
6 The IO tables are updated every 5 years (year ending 2 and 7).
BEA provides estimated tables for other years.
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APPENDIX A: SELECTING THE PENALTY
PARAMETER λ FOR THE LASSO QUANTILE
REGRESSION
We determine λ for each industry in a data driven way
that maximizes the backtesting performance of the esti-
mated VaR of the industry. Specifically, for an industry i,
we carry out the following steps:
Step 1: For each c in the ν-equidistant grid
C = {c1 <    < ck = c1 + (k − 1)ν <    < cL}, we deter-
mine the penalty parameter λ(c) using four following
steps.
• Step 1a. Take T i.i.d. draw from the Uniform distribu-
tion U[0, 1] independent of the timing of the dataset of
the regression, denoted as u1, u2,   , uT. Calculate the
following variable:
Λ=T × max
1≤ k≤K
1
T
XT
t=1
Wit,k q− I ut ≤ qð Þð Þ
σ^k
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 1−qð Þp

 ðA1Þ
• Step 1b. Repeat Step 1a for 500 times to obtain an
empirical distribution of Λ, conditional on the value of
Wi. Given a confidence level 1 − α, the penalty param-
eter is calculated as
λ cð Þ= c×Q Λ,1−αð Þ ðA2Þ
where Q(Λ, 1 − α) is the 1 − α quantile of the empirical
distribution of Λ. We follow Belloni and Cher-
nozhukov (2011) suggestion and set α = 0.1.
• Step 1c. Estimate the l1-penalized quantile regression
according to Equation (5) and retain only variables in
Wi whose absolute value is greater than 0.0001. Using
the remaining variables, estimate the post-LASSO qua-
ntile regression to obtain the corresponding post-
LASSO estimated coefficients and the fitted value of
the quantile (VaR) of the dependent variable
over time.
• Step 1d. Backtest the estimated VaR using Hautsch
et al. (2015) log likelihood ratio test: obtain the VaR
exceedance series VEt = I Xit < ^VaRq,t
 
and estimate
the logistic regression model:
VEt = θ0 + VEt−1,VEt−2,VEt−3, ^VaRq,t−1
 
θ+ εt = θ0
+V 0tθ+ εt
ðA3Þ
The log likelihood ratio test statistic for the null
hypothesis that the VaR exceedance is i.i.d. Bernoulli dis-
tributed with success probability q is
LR= −2 lnℒr− lnℒuð Þ ~aχ25 ðA4Þ
where
lnLu=
X
VEtlnFlog θ0 +V 0tθ
 
+ 1−VEtð Þ

ln 1−Flog θ0 +V 0tθ
  
lnLr =
X
VEtln qð Þ+ T−
X
VEt
 
ln 1−qð Þ
and F log θ0 +V 0tθ
 
is the fitted value of the logistic regres-
sion. Obtain the p-value of the test p(c).
Step 2. Repeat step 1 for every c in the C grid and
select the c that produces the highest p(c) to be the opti-
mal value of c. The corresponding value of the penalty
parameter is the optimal λ for the LASSO quantile
regression.
APPENDIX B: LIST OF US INDUSTRIES
No Full name Abbreviation
1 Farms FARM
2 Oil and gas extraction OG
3 Mining, except oil and gas MNG
4 Support activities for mining MNGS
5 Utilities UTL
6 Construction CTN
7 Wood products WP
8 Nonmetallic mineral products MNR
9 Primary metals MTL
10 Fabricated metal products FMTL
11 Machinery MCN
12 Computer and electronic products CPT
13 Electrical equipment, appliances, and
components
ELT
14 Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and
parts
MOTP
15 Other transportation equipment OTPE
16 Furniture and related products FURN
17 Miscellaneous manufacturing MMFG
18 Food and beverage and tobacco
products
FB
20 NGUYEN ET AL.
No Full name Abbreviation
19 Textile mills and textile product mills TXT
20 Apparel and leather and allied products LEA
21 Paper products PAP
22 Printing and related support activities PRT
23 Petroleum and coal products PECO
24 Chemical products CMC
25 Plastics and rubber products PLA
26 Wholesale trade WST
27 Motor vehicle and parts dealers MOTD
28 Food and beverage stores FBST
29 General merchandize stores GMST
30 Other retail OR
31 Air transportation ARTP
32 Rail transportation RLTP
33 Water transportation WATP
34 Truck transportation TRTP
35 Pipeline transportation PTP
36 Other transportation and support
activities
OTP
37 Publishing industries, except internet
(includes software)
PUB
38 Motion picture and sound recording
industries
MP
39 Federal Reserve banks, credit
intermediation, and related activities
FED
40 Securities, commodity contracts, and
investments
INV
41 Insurance carriers and related activities INS
42 Funds, trusts, and other financial
vehicles
FUND
43 Real estate RE
44 Rental and leasing services and lessors
of intangible assets
RL
45 Legal services LGL
46 Computer systems design and related
services
CPTS
47 Miscellaneous professional, scientific,
and technical services
MTEC
48 Administrative and support services ADM
49 Waste management and remediation
services
WAST
50 Educational services EDU
51 Ambulatory health care services AH
52 Hospitals HOSP
53 Nursing and residential care facilities NURS
54 Social assistance SA
(Continues)
No Full name Abbreviation
55 Performing arts, spectator sports,
museums, and related activities
ART
56 Amusements, gambling, and recreation
industries
RCT
57 Accommodation ACM
58 Food services and drinking places FDP
59 Other services, except government OS
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY STATISTIC OF US
INDUSTRIES
This appendix shows the mean, standard deviation,
skewness, and kurtosis of the returns of each industry
in our sample from January 2005 to December 2016.
The Jarque and Bera (1987) test statistic for the nor-
mality test of the returns of each industry is also
reported. The appendix also contains the average value
of the specific characteristics of each industry during
the examined period. See Appendix B for the full
names of the industries.
Industry Mean
Standard
deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
test statistic
Average
leverage
Average
maturity
mismatch
Average
size
Average
weekly
volatility
FARM 0.003 0.042 0.017 4.944 98.718 2.090 −0.104 9.306 0.017
OG 0.002 0.045 −0.622 8.194 745.065 2.210 −0.065 13.634 0.019
MNG 0.002 0.050 −0.059 6.515 323.208 2.068 −0.129 12.515 0.020
MNGS 0.002 0.050 −0.685 7.840 661.094 1.893 −0.118 12.344 0.020
UTL 0.002 0.022 −1.393 14.076 3,407.663 3.777 0.018 15.127 0.009
CTN 0.001 0.047 0.820 10.376 1,491.364 3.242 −0.087 12.358 0.018
WP 0.001 0.046 0.140 10.577 1,501.788 2.646 −0.133 9.386 0.017
MNR 0.002 0.046 −0.139 7.194 461.479 3.015 −0.017 11.889 0.017
MTL 0.002 0.047 −0.004 8.423 768.285 2.419 −0.039 12.693 0.018
FMTL 0.003 0.032 −0.270 7.401 513.722 3.166 −0.068 11.554 0.012
MCN 0.002 0.035 0.134 8.312 739.181 2.907 0.012 12.969 0.013
CPT 0.002 0.028 −0.333 5.696 201.478 1.944 −0.408 14.125 0.011
ELT 0.002 0.031 −0.182 6.082 251.606 2.806 −0.146 11.755 0.013
MOTP 0.002 0.041 −0.077 7.202 461.815 3.643 0.079 13.971 0.015
OTPE 0.003 0.029 −0.456 6.768 392.682 4.181 −0.092 12.932 0.011
FURN 0.001 0.043 0.186 6.377 301.572 2.389 −0.091 9.760 0.016
MMFG 0.002 0.023 −1.061 10.388 1,543.471 1.872 −0.351 11.884 0.009
FB 0.002 0.018 −1.470 16.577 5,041.553 3.085 −0.007 13.639 0.007
TXT 0.002 0.048 0.512 9.762 1,221.857 2.301 0.032 9.353 0.016
LEA 0.002 0.034 0.033 7.080 435.013 2.040 −0.128 11.802 0.013
PAP 0.002 0.026 −0.315 6.502 330.702 3.020 −0.012 12.284 0.011
PRT 0.001 0.036 −0.219 7.543 544.213 3.795 −0.020 10.000 0.013
PECO 0.002 0.030 −0.790 8.556 871.832 2.036 −0.066 14.678 0.013
CMC 0.002 0.021 −0.899 10.747 1,652.280 2.287 −0.169 14.437 0.009
PLA 0.002 0.037 0.003 8.667 838.946 5.228 −0.044 11.010 0.013
WST 0.002 0.024 −0.627 8.772 911.360 3.178 −0.046 13.036 0.009
MOTD 0.003 0.034 0.597 12.567 2,428.518 3.729 0.228 10.772 0.013
FBST 0.002 0.029 −0.085 4.822 87.513 2.829 −0.071 11.636 0.012
GMST 0.001 0.024 −0.432 6.955 428.286 2.636 −0.035 12.809 0.010
OR 0.002 0.028 −0.088 6.933 404.845 2.429 −0.062 13.376 0.011
ARTP 0.003 0.053 0.237 6.418 311.035 14.286 −0.113 12.868 0.021
RLTP 0.004 0.037 −0.237 5.113 122.515 2.252 −0.022 12.322 0.015
WATP 0.001 0.039 −0.477 8.143 714.683 2.364 0.007 12.059 0.015
TRTP 0.002 0.037 0.129 4.812 87.517 2.974 −0.014 10.007 0.015
PTP 0.003 0.038 −0.575 8.871 935.201 2.934 0.011 13.045 0.014
OTP 0.001 0.029 0.010 5.556 170.659 2.581 −0.111 11.612 0.012
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Industry Mean
Standard
deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
test statistic
Average
leverage
Average
maturity
mismatch
Average
size
Average
weekly
volatility
PUB 0.002 0.027 −0.490 6.481 341.708 2.019 −0.576 12.974 0.011
MP 0.003 0.036 0.315 11.875 2068.042 2.611 −0.071 11.674 0.014
FED 0.001 0.044 0.949 18.025 5,992.016 18.198 −0.009 17.621 0.016
INV 0.002 0.038 0.042 9.411 1,073.952 16.191 0.007 15.706 0.015
INS 0.002 0.029 −0.393 16.981 5,123.029 9.868 −0.069 16.017 0.011
FUND 0.002 0.032 −0.562 9.530 1,147.168 5.509 0.611 12.482 0.012
RE 0.001 0.045 −0.280 8.560 815.830 3.320 0.041 13.426 0.017
RL 0.002 0.043 0.064 9.785 1,203.079 4.489 0.005 12.002 0.016
LGL 0.005 0.044 0.198 6.043 246.065 3.843 0.014 9.076 0.017
CPTS 0.002 0.029 −0.155 6.112 255.473 2.441 −0.248 12.042 0.012
MTEC 0.002 0.028 −0.229 6.901 402.965 3.578 −0.118 12.355 0.012
ADM 0.002 0.028 0.046 6.448 310.859 3.345 −0.147 11.499 0.011
WAST 0.002 0.024 −0.688 9.546 1,168.916 3.217 −0.004 11.001 0.010
EDU 0.000 0.043 −0.037 6.290 282.884 2.103 −0.391 9.858 0.016
AH 0.002 0.027 −1.024 10.741 1,675.196 2.624 −0.186 11.342 0.010
HOSP 0.002 0.039 −0.553 7.137 479.051 38.601 −0.018 11.291 0.015
NURS 0.001 0.040 −0.632 9.112 1,017.667 3.746 −0.049 9.769 0.015
SA 0.004 0.051 1.533 18.060 6,170.899 7.525 −0.029 7.321 0.018
ART 0.001 0.041 0.919 15.928 4,454.740 2.620 −0.181 9.237 0.014
RCT 0.002 0.040 −0.015 7.748 588.978 5.871 −0.028 10.557 0.015
ACM 0.002 0.048 0.528 10.230 1,394.843 4.480 −0.079 11.903 0.017
FDP 0.002 0.028 0.053 5.461 158.581 4.072 −0.136 10.015 0.012
OS 0.002 0.031 −0.091 7.059 431.334 6.428 −0.023 9.923 0.012
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